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Abstract
This paper presents an approach for the development of model-checkers in a framework, called
TOM, merging declarative and imperative features. We illustrate our method by specifying in
TOM the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol that aims to establish a mutual authentication
between an initiator and a responder that communicate via an insecure network. We describe the
behavior of the agents exchanging messages as well as the intruders and the security invariants the
protocol should verify using the rewrite rules of TOM. The (depth-ﬁrst or breadth-ﬁrst) exploration
of the search space is described using the imperative features of the language. We propose several
optimizations and we compare our results to existing approaches.
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1 Introduction
Programming with rewrite rules and strategies has been already used for de-
scribing several computational logics and transition systems. In rewrite based
languages like ELAN [2] or MAUDE [4] the transitions can be described by
conditional rewrite rules and the way these rules are applied is deﬁned using
strategies. For example, one can deﬁne a strategy that applies exhaustively
all the rules in all the possible ways and thus verify if, starting from an initial
state, a certain state can be reached (by successive transitions). It is then
natural to use such rewrite based frameworks in order to model-check tran-
sition systems and, in particular, cryptographic protocols like the Needham-
Schroeder public-key protocol.
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The Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol [14] has been already ana-
lyzed using several methodologies from model-checkers like FDR [15] to ap-
proaches based on theorem proving like NRL [10]. Although this protocol is
described only by a few rules it has been proved insecure only in 1995 by G.
Lowe [8]. After the discovery of the security problem and the correctness proof
of a modiﬁed version [9], several other approaches have been used to exhibit
the attack and obtain correct versions [10,12,5].
The ﬁnal goal of the protocol is to provide mutual authentication between
agents communicating via an insecure network. The agents use public keys
distributed by a key server in order to encrypt their messages. We consider
here a simpliﬁed version proposed by G. Lowe in [8] where we assume that
each agent knows the public keys of all the other agents but it does not have
access to their private keys.
In this paper we analyze the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using
an approach where rewrite rules are combined with an imperative style of
programming leading to a clear and ﬂexible speciﬁcation that can be executed
eﬃciently. More precisely, we explain how this protocol can be speciﬁed in
TOM [13], an extension of C and Java which adds pattern matching facilities
to these languages.
The protocol is described by deﬁning the messages exchanged between the
participants and their consequent change of state. For example, an agent
that wants to initiate a new communication session sends a message (in the
network) and goes into a new state in which it expects a conﬁrmation message.
The protocol can thus be seen as a sequence of states of the agents (including
possible intruders) and of the communication network. Therefore it is natural
to use rewrite rules in order to describe the transition from one state to another
and strategies in order to describe the way these rules are applied.
The state transitions of the agents and of the intruder as well as the in-
variants the protocol should satisfy are described by TOM conditional rewrite
rules. The speciﬁcation is both natural and concise, the rewrite rules describ-
ing the protocol being directly obtained from classical presentations [8]. In
order to improve the eﬃciency, the imperative features of the language are
used.
The strategy guiding these rules and thus exploring the search space is
completely deﬁned using the imperative part of TOM. We obtain a very ﬂex-
ible and eﬃcient speciﬁcation of depth-ﬁrst and breadth-ﬁrst strategies. The
execution of the speciﬁcation allows one, on the one hand, to describe attacks
and, on the other hand, to certify the corrected version by exploring all the
possible behaviors.
Section 2 brieﬂy presents the TOM environment. The Needham-Schroeder
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Fig. 1. The interaction between TOM and ApiGen
public-key protocol is described in Section 3 together with an attack and a
corrected version. Section 4 presents the encoding of the protocol and com-
pares our results with other approaches. The last section concludes the paper
and presents perspectives to this work.
2 The TOM Environment
TOM is a language extension which adds new matching primitives to exist-
ing imperative languages. This is particularly well-suited when describing
various transformations of structured entities like, for example, trees/terms
and XML documents. The main originality of this system is its language and
data-structure independence. From an implementation point of view, it is a
compiler which accepts diﬀerent native languages like C or Java and whose
compilation process consists in translating the matching constructs into the
underlying native language. Its design follows our experiences on the eﬃcient
compilation of rule-based systems [7]. For an interested reader, design and
implementation issues related to TOM are presented in [13].
The language provides support for matching modulo sophisticated theo-
ries. For example, we can specify a matching modulo associativity and neutral
element (also known as list-matching) that is particularly useful to model the
exploration of a search space and to perform list or XML based transforma-
tions.
The TOM tool is used in conjunction with the ApiGen system which is a
generator of abstract syntax tree implementations [16] (see Figure 1). Starting
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from an input datatype deﬁnition, ApiGen generates a datatype in Java and a
deﬁnition of this datatype as input for TOM. The users can then write code
using the match construct on the generated Abstract Syntax Tree classes and
TOM compiles this to normal Java. The generated code is characterized by
strong typing combined with a generic interface and by maximal sub-term
sharing for memory eﬃciency and fast equality checking.
For expository reasons, we assume that TOM only adds two new constructs:
%match and build (‘). The ﬁrst construct is similar to the match primitive
of ML and related languages: given a term (called subject) and a list of
pairs pattern-action, the match primitive selects a pattern that matches the
subject and performs the associated action. This construct may thus be seen
as an extension of the classical switch/case construct. The second construct
is a mechanism that allows one to easily build ground terms over a deﬁned
signature. This operator, called build, is followed by a well-formed term built
over constructors, variables and function calls. This term is written in preﬁx
notation.
In order to give a better understanding of TOM’s features, let us consider
a simple symbolic predicate (greaterThan) deﬁned on Peano integers built
using the zero and suc symbols. When using Java as the native language,
the comparison of two integers can be described in the following way:
boolean greaterThan(Nat t1, Nat t2) {
%match(Nat t1, Nat t2) {
x,x -> { return true; }
suc(_),zero() -> { return true; }
zero(),suc(_) -> { return false; }
suc(x),suc(y) -> { return greaterThan(x,y); }
}
}
This example should be read as follows: given two terms t1 and t2 (that
represent Peano integers), the evaluation of greaterThan returns true if t1 is
greater or equal to t2. This is implemented by (non-linear) pattern matching
(ﬁrst pattern) and anonymous variables (second and third patterns). The
reader should note that variables do not need to be declared: their type is
automatically inferred from the deﬁnitions of the operators using them. To
distinguish a constant from a variable (e.g. the constant zero), empty braces
could be used.
As mentioned previously, an important feature of TOM is to support list
matching, also known as associative matching with neutral element. Let
us consider the associative operator conc used for building lists of naturals
(NatList). In TOM, an associative operator is variadic and each sub-term
could be either of sort element or list (respectively Nat or NatList in our
case). To illustrate the expressiveness of associative matching, we can deﬁne
a sorting algorithm as follows:
public NatList sort(NatList l) {
%match(NatList l) {
conc(X1*,x,X2*,y,X3*) -> {
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if(greaterThan(x,y)) { return ‘sort(conc(X1*,y,X2*,x,X3*)); }
}
_ -> { return l; }
}
}
In this example, one can remark the use of list variables, annotated by
a ‘*’: such a variable should be instantiated by a (possibly empty) list. Given
a partially sorted list, the sort function tries to ﬁnd two elements x and y
such that x is greater than y. If two such elements exist, they are swapped and
the sort function is recursively applied. When the list is sorted this pattern
cannot by found in the list and the next pattern is tried. In fact, this pattern
imposes no restrictions on its subject and thus the corresponding action is
triggered and the sorted list l is returned.
3 The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
The Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol [14] aims to establish a mutual
authentication between an initiator and a responder that communicate via an
insecure network. Each agent A possesses a public key denoted K(A) that can
be obtained by any other agent from a key server and a (private) secret key
that is the inverse of K(A). A message m encrypted with the public key of
the agent A is denoted by {m}
K(A) and can be decrypted only by the owner
of the corresponding secret key, i.e. by A.
In this paper we only consider the simpliﬁed version proposed in [8] as-
suming that each agent knows at the beginning the public keys of all the other
agents.
1. A → B: {NA, A}K(B)
2. B → A: {NA, NB}K(A)
3. A → B: {NB}K(B)
The protocol uses nonces that are fresh random numbers to be used in a
single run of the protocol. We denote the nonce generated by the agent A by
NA.
The initiator A seeks to establish a session with the agent B. For this, A
sends a message to B containing a newly generated nonce NA together with
its identity and this message is encrypted with its key K(B). When such a
message is received by B, the agent can decrypt it and extract the nonce NA
and the identity of the sender. The agent B generates a new nonce NB and
sends it to A together with NA in a message encrypted with the public key of
A. When A receives this response, it can decrypt the message and assumes
that a session has been established with B. The agent A sends the nonce
NB back to B and when receiving this last message B assumes that a session
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has been established with A since only A could have decrypted the message
containing NB.
The main property expected for an authentication protocol like Needham-
Schroeder public-key protocol is to prevent an intruder from impersonating
one of the two agents.
The intruder is a user of the communication network and so, it can initiate
standard sessions with the other agents and it can respond to messages sent
by the other agents. The intruder can intercept any message from the network
and can decrypt the messages encrypted with its key. The nonces obtained
from the decrypted messages can be used by the intruder for generating new
(fake) messages. The intercepted messages that can not be decrypted by the
intruder are replayed as they are.
An attack on the protocol is presented in [8] where the intruder imperson-
ates an agent A in order to establish a session with an agent B. The attack
involves two simultaneous runs of the protocol: one initiated by A in order to
establish a communication with the intruder I and a second one initiated by
I that tries to impersonate A (denoted by I(A)) in order to establish a com-
munication with B. The attack involves the following steps, where I.n, II.n
represent steps in the ﬁrst and second session respectively and I(A) represents
the intruder impersonating the agent A:
I.1. A → I : {NA, A}K(I)
II.1. I(A) → B : {NA, A}K(B)
II.2. B → I(A) : {NA, NB}K(A)
I.2. I → A : {NA, NB}K(A)
I.3. A → I : {NB}K(I)
II.3. I(A) → B : {NB}K(B)
The agent A tries to establish a session with the intruder I by sending a
newly generated nonce NA. The intruder decrypts the message and initiates
a second session with B but claiming to be A. The agent B responds to I
with a message encrypted with the key of A and the intruder intercepts it
and forwards it to A. A is able to decrypt this last message and sends the
appropriate response to I. The intruder can thus obtain the nonce NB and
sends it encrypted to B. At this moment B thinks that a session has been
established with A while this session has in fact been established with the
intruder.
In the correction shown sound in [9] the responder introduces its identity
in the encrypted part of the message and the initiator checks if this identity
corresponds to the agent it has started the session with. The second step of
the protocol is then modiﬁed and the corrected protocol becomes:
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1. A → B: {NA, A}K(B)
2. B → A: {NA, NB, B}K(A)
3. A → B: {NB}K(B)
4 Encoding the Needham-Schroeder Protocol in TOM
In this section we give a description of the protocol in TOM. The TOM rewrite
rules correspond to transitions of agents from one state to another after send-
ing and/or receiving messages. The strategies guiding the application of these
rewrite rules describe a form of model-checking in which all the possible behav-
iors are explored. This exploration can be done in a depth-ﬁrst or breadth-ﬁrst
manner. The former approach is more eﬃcient for detecting an attack when it
exists and thus when the exploration of the search space is not complete, while
the latter approach is more eﬃcient when a corrected version is analyzed and
thus all the possible states are eventually explored. The speciﬁcation tech-
nique we have proposed in this paper allows us to explore a ﬁnite state space
and thus, it is well suited for detecting the attacks against the protocol and
not for proving its correctness in an unbounded model.
We present ﬁrst the encoding of the diﬀerent entities taking part in the
protocol such as the agents exchanging messages, the intruder(s) intercepting
these messages and the network used as communication support. As we will
see later on, the number of agents (initiators and responders) is not hard-coded
in the implementation but this number should be speciﬁed when checking the
speciﬁcation. This allows us, on the one hand, to show the expressiveness of
a TOM speciﬁcation and, on the other hand, to compare the results, in terms
of eﬃciency, with other approaches like ELAN [3] and Murϕ [6].
Each agent is characterized by a state that is modiﬁed when it sends or
receives a message. The transitions of the agents and, more generally, of the
global environment, from one state to another are speciﬁed by TOM rewrite
rules. All the possible behaviors are then explored by trying to apply each of
the deﬁned rules on the current state.
As mentioned previously, the datatypes are deﬁned abstractly using many-
sorted signatures and, more precisely, we use ApiGen to generate a Java imple-
mentation which ensures maximal sub-term sharing. A complete speciﬁcation
of the agents, messages and the network is described in section 4.1. In sec-
tion 4.2, we show how TOM can be used in order to describe concisely the
behavior of the agents (using transition rules) and the exploration of the search
space (using Java native code).
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4.1 Data Structures
The agents (that can be either initiators or responders) are deﬁned by three
attributes: the identity id, the current state state and a nonce nonce they
have created. Objects of type Agent can be built using the constructor agent
as speciﬁed by the following ApiGen deﬁnition:
Agent ::= agent(id:AgentId, state:AgentState, nonce:Nonce)
The identity of an agent is either a name deﬁned explicitly or a generic sender
or receiver:
AgentId ::= alice | bob | dai
| sender(number:int)
| receiver(number:int)
There are three possible values for AgentState states. An agent is in the
state SLEEP if it has neither sent nor received a request for a new session.
In the state WAIT the agent has already sent or received a request and when
reaching the state COMMIT the agent has established a session. All these states
are deﬁned explicitly:
AgentState ::= SLEEP | WAIT | COMMIT
The nonces created by the agents are normally random numbers that iden-
tify a session but in our encoding we consider nonces that keep track of the
agents using them:
Nonce ::= N(id1:AgentId, id2:AgentId)
When using this kind of encoding, if the agent that generated a nonce memo-
rizes it then, the agent knows at each moment who is the agent with whom it
is establishing a session. For example, the agent alice generates and mem-
orizes the nonce N(alice,bob) when trying to establish a session with bob.
A dummy nonce DN is deﬁned as N(dai,dai) where dai is a dummy agent
identity.
The messages exchanged between agents contain the identities of the sender
(src) and of the receiver (dst) of the message, the encryption key (key), two
nonces (nonce1 and nonce2) and the explicit address of the sender:
Message ::= msg(src:AgentId, dst:AgentId, key:Key,
nonce1:Nonce, nonce2:Nonce, adr:Address)
The address of an agent as well as its private key depend only on its identity:
Address ::= A(id:AgentId)
Key ::= K(id:AgentId)
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The header of the message containing the source and destination addresses
are not encrypted (and thus can be faked by an intruder) while the body of
the message containing all the other information is encrypted with the given
key and can be decrypted only by the owner of the private key.
The communication network can be seen as a list of messages and therefore
we introduce, using the list constructor of ApiGen, the type ListMessage as
a list of objects of type Message. Similarly, we can deﬁne lists of agents
(ListAgent) and of nonces (ListNonce).
The intruder is a special agent that does not only participate to normal
communications but can as well intercept and create (fake) messages. An
intruder stores (in nonces) the nonces of the intercepted messages that are
encrypted with its key and (in messages) the messages it cannot decrypt.
Intruder ::= intruder(id:AgentId, nonces:ListNonce,
messages:ListMessage)
The rewrite rules presented in the next section describe the modiﬁcations
of the global state that consists of the states of all the agents involved in the
communication and the state of the network. There are also two particular
states representing a conﬁguration obtained after a successful attack on the
current session and an error during the message exchange respectively:
State ::= state(senders:ListAgent, receivers:ListAgent,
intruder:Intruder, network:ListMessage)
| ATTACK | ERROR
4.2 Rewrite Rules
The rewrite rules describe the behavior of the honest agents involved in a
session and the behavior of the intruder that tries to impersonate one of the
agents.The invariants of the protocol are expressed by rewrite rules as well.
4.2.1 The Agents
Each modiﬁcation of the state of one of the participants to a session is de-
scribed by a rewrite rule. At the beginning, all the agents are in the state
SLEEP waiting either to initiate a session or to receive a request for a new
session.
When an initiator x is in the state SLEEP, it can initiate a session with a
(randomly chosen) responder y by sending a message containing a nonce and
its address and encoded with the public key of y. We can describe the global
state change by the following rule:
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senders :
receivers :
intruder :
network :
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
S∗1 + agent(x,SLEEP, )+ S
∗
2
R∗1 + agent(y, , )+ R
∗
2
I
M∗
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
=⇒
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
S∗1 + agent(x,WAIT,N(x,y)) + S
∗
2
R∗1 + agent(y, , )+ R
∗
2
I
M∗ + msg(x,y,K(y),N(x,y),DN(),A(x))
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
if sizeMessage(M∗) < maxMessagesInNetwork
where the symbol “ ” represents an insigniﬁcant value w.r.t the current trans-
formation and symbols of the form S∗1 are place-holders for (possibly empty)
lists of values. For example, when writing S∗1 + agent(x,SLEEP, ) + S
∗
2 an
agent in the state SLEEP is non-deterministically selected from the list of
senders and its identity is stored in the variable x. For expository reasons, we
use an abuse of notation in the rule above: “ ” is used in the right-hand side
of the rule to denote the fact that the corresponding value is not modiﬁed by
the rule. To be rigorous, we should have introduced named variables in the
left-hand side and re-used them in the right-hand side of the rule.
The initiator sends a nonce N(x,y) and its address (identity) encrypted
with the public key of the responder. Since only one nonce is necessary in this
message, a dummy nonce DN() is used in the second ﬁeld of the message. The
message is sent, i.e. inserted in the list of messages representing the network,
only if the capacity of the network (maxMessagesInNetwork) is not exceeded.
As we will see in what follows all these messages can be intercepted, stored
and forwarded (in a random but systematic way) by the intruder that listens
the network. Consequently, considering only a network of size one leads to
equivalent results but this extension allows us to show the extensibility of the
approach and to provide more benchmarks.
Starting from this deﬁnition, the TOM rule follows immediately:
state(concAgent(S1*,agent(x,SLEEP(),_),S2*),
dst@concAgent(_*,agent(y,_,_),_*), I, M*) -> {
if(sizeMessage(‘M*) < maxMessagesInNetwork) {
State state = ‘state(concAgent(S1*,agent(x,WAIT(),N(x,y)),S2*),
dst,I,
concMessage(msg(x,y,K(y),N(x,y),DN(),A(x)),M*));
set.add(state);
}
}
In the above rewrite rule x and y are variables of type AgentId representing
the identity of the initiator and the identity of the responder respectively.
Since concAgent is a list constructor (of AgentList), an associative matching
is employed when dealing with this operator and thus the identities of the
two agents, x and y, are selected non-deterministically from the two lists
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of initiators and receivers respectively. In fact, all possible solutions of the
corresponding matching will be considered when exploring exhaustively the
search space. We use in this rule several syntactic features provided by TOM:
the “dst@” annotation allows us to give a name to a matched sub-term. As any
other variable, this can can be re-used in the action part to build a new term.
The notations ‘_’ and ‘_*’ are used for anonymous variables and list-variables
respectively. The latter one can be instantiated by the empty list.
The sender having sent the message switches to the state WAIT where it
waits for a response. The list of responders dst is left unchanged (since only
used for selecting a possible destination).
A second similar rule considers the case where the destination of the initial
message is the intruder instead of a responder.
senders :
receivers :
intruder :
network :
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
S∗1 + agent(x,SLEEP, )+ S
∗
2
R∗
intruder(w, , )
M∗
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
=⇒
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
S∗1 + agent(x,WAIT,N(x,w)) + S
∗
2
R∗
intruder(w, , )
M∗ + msg(x,w,K(w),N(x,w),DN(),A(x))
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
if sizeMessage(M∗) < maxMessagesInNetwork
If the destination of the previously sent message is a responder in the state
SLEEP, then this agent gets the message and decrypts it, if encrypted with
its key. In this latter case, the responder sends the second message of the
protocol to the initiator and goes in the state WAIT where it waits for the ﬁnal
acknowledgment. For eﬃciency reasons we can suppose that all messages are
intercepted by the intruder and only afterwards forwarded to the concerned
agents. We implement this optimization proposed in [11] and we consider
that the initiator and the responder listen only to messages coming from the
intruder:
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
S∗
R∗1 + agent(y,SLEEP, )+ R
∗
2
intruder(w, , )
M∗1 + msg(w,y,K(y),N1, ,A(z))+ M
∗
2
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
=⇒
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
S∗
R∗1 + agent(y,WAIT,N(y,z)) + R
∗
2
intruder(w, , )
M∗1 + msg(y,z,K(z),N1,N(y,z),A(y)) + M
∗
2
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
Once again, due to the associative matching used for the message lists, the
position of the message in the network (i.e. the moment when the message
was sent) is not important. Notice that the message should not only have y as
destination but it should be also encrypted with its public key. The encrypted
identity of the sender of the message will be used in order to build the response
to this message.
Two other rewrite rules describe the other steps of the protocol. For these
rules as well we consider only messages that have been intercepted and for-
warded by the intruder. The speciﬁcation of the original version of the protocol
can be easily adapted in order to obtain the corrected one. Since the agents
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always send their identity, all we have to do is to add a test checking that the
correct identity have been provided in the rule corresponding to the second
step of the protocol.
When an initiator x and a responder y have reached the state COMMIT at
the end of a correct session, the nonce N(y,x) can be used as a symmetric
encryption key for further communications between the two agents.
4.2.2 The Intruder
The intruder should be considered as a normal agent that can not only partici-
pate in normal sessions but that also tries to break the security of the protocol
by obtaining information that are supposed to be conﬁdential.
For doing so, the intruder eavesdrops the network that serves as commu-
nication support and thus, common and accessible to all the agents. Hence,
the intruder observes and intercepts any message in the network, decrypts
messages encrypted with its key and stores the obtained information, replays
intercepted messages and generates fake messages starting from the informa-
tion it has gained.
The intruder intercepts all the messages in the network except for the
messages generated by itself and stores or decrypts them. We just present
here the rule corresponding to a message the intruder can decrypt:
senders :
receivers :
intruder :
network :
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
S∗
R∗
intruder(x,L∗, )
M∗1 + msg(y, ,K(x),N1,N2, )+ M
∗
2
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
=⇒
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
S∗
R∗
intruder(x,L∗ + N1 + N2, )
M∗1 + M
∗
2
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
if x = y
We have to check that the source of the messages intercepted by the intruder
is not the intruder itself since otherwise the intruder can engage in an inﬁnite
loop where it generates and intercepts the same message forever.
The case where the intruder cannot decode the message and thus just stores
it, is handled in a similar and simpler way. These (encrypted) messages stored
by the intruder are sent to all the agents without modifying the encrypted
part but specifying that the message comes from the intruder. The TOM rule
describing this behavior is similar to the previous ones: the message to be sent
and its destination are selected non-deterministically from the list of stored
messages and from the list of senders/receivers respectively.
The intruder also tries to impersonate all the agents by sending fake mes-
sages built using the nonces previously obtained. This time both the destina-
tion of the message and the fake address in the encrypted part of the message
are generated non-deterministically:
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senders :
receivers :
intruder :
network :
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
S∗
R∗
intruder(w,L∗, )
M∗
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
=⇒
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
S∗
R∗
intruder(w,L∗, )
M∗ + msg(w,y,K(y),resp,init,A(y’))
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
if sizeMessage(M∗) < maxMessagesInNetwork
if msg(w,y,K(y),resp,init,A(y’)) ∈M∗
where (agent(y, , ), agent(y’, , )) ∈ ((S∗ + R∗)× (S∗ + R∗))
where (resp, init) ∈ (L∗ × L∗)
The fake source y’ and destination y of the generated message are selected
non-deterministically from the list obtained as the concatenation of the lists
of senders and receivers. The two nonces of the message are obtained similarly
from the list of nonces the intruder has stored. The generated message is sent
only if it has not already been done previously.
The conditions involving cartesian products can be encoded easily in TOM
by list-matching the needed (agent) expressions from the same list (S∗ +R∗).
The two lists are matched separately obtaining thus all the possible combi-
nations source/destination. In the following rule we use a syntactic extension
of TOM which allows us to omit the name of the list operator when there
is no ambiguity and to abbreviate concAgent(S*), concMessage(S*) and
concNonce(S*) by (S*):
state(S*, R*, intru@intruder(w,nonces,ll), M*) -> {
if(sizeMessage(‘M*) < maxMessagesInNetwork) {
ListAgent SR = ‘(S*,R*);
%match(ListAgent SR, ListAgent SR,
ListNonce nonces, ListNonce nonces) {
(_*,agent(y,_,_),_*), (_*,agent(yp,_,_),_*),
(_*,init,_*), (_*,resp,_*) -> {
Message message = ‘msg(w,y,K(y),resp,init,A(yp));
if(!existMessage(message,‘M*)) {
State state = ‘state(S*,R*,intru,(message,M*));
set.add(state);
} } } } }
Due to the associative matching used for selecting nonces and agents, every
time this rule is applied either a diﬀerent message is generated or the message
is sent to a diﬀerent destination. This way the intruder generates all the
possible messages and sends them (if not already sent) to all the possible
agents. A similar rule describes the construction of messages containing only
one nonce.
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4.2.3 The Invariants
The invariants used to specify the correctness conditions of the protocol are
expressed as well by rewrite rules. We have to check the authenticity of the
responder, that is, to check if the agent that replied to the initiator is indeed
the correct one (and not the intruder, for example). Similarly, we should verify
that the communication was established with the agent that initiated it, that
is, the authenticity of the initiator.
Instead of specifying the conditions that should be respected by the agents
having established a communication we deﬁne their negation that can be seen
as a violation of the authenticity of the protocol.
The rewrite rule describing the negation of the ﬁrst invariant and thus,
the possibility of an attack checks if an initiator has concluded the protocol
(i.e. is in the state COMMIT) while the corresponding responder (that is not an
intruder) has neither committed nor sent an appropriate response (and thus
ready for committing). More precisely, an attack is possible if there exists an
initiator in the state COMMIT such that the corresponding responder is neither
in the state COMMIT nor in the state WAIT (waiting for an acknowledgment
from the initiator).
senders :
receivers :
intruder :
network :
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
S∗1 + agent(x,COMMIT,N(x,y)) + S
∗
2
R∗
intruder(w, , )
M∗
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
=⇒ ATTACK
if y = w
if agent(y,WAIT,N(y,x)) ∈ R∗
if agent(y,COMMIT,N(y,x)) ∈ R∗
For the authenticity of the initiator we proceed similarly and we verify if a
responder is in the state COMMIT while the corresponding initiator has not
reached this state yet:
senders :
receivers :
intruder :
network :
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
S∗
R∗1 + agent(y,COMMIT,N(y,x)) + R
∗
2
intruder(w, , )
M∗
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
=⇒ ATTACK
if x = w
if agent(x,COMMIT,N(x,y)) ∈ S∗
If one of these two rewrite rules can be applied during the execution of the
speciﬁcation then the authenticity of the protocol is not ensured and an attack
can be described from the trace of the execution. If the ﬁrst rewrite rule can
be applied we can conclude that the responder has been impersonated (by the
intruder) and if the second rewrite rule can be applied we can conclude that
the initiator has been impersonated (by the intruder).
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4.3 Exploring the Search Space
The rewrite rules used to specify the behavior of the protocol and the invari-
ants should be guided by a strategy describing their application. Basically,
we want to apply repeatedly all the above rewrite rules in any order and in
all the possible ways until one of the attack rules can be applied.
In a previous implementation written in ELAN, the backtracking mecha-
nism was used to explore the search space: when a message does not lead
to an attack, a backtrack is performed and a new destination and/or address
are selected. We go on like this until an attack is discovered or no new mes-
sages can be generated. This allows the intruder to generate all the possible
messages and send them (if not already sent) to all the possible agents. One
diﬃculty, when using a backtracking approach, is to model a strategy other
than the depth-ﬁrst one. In our case, since several transitions can lead to the
same state, it is interesting to explore the search space with a breadth-ﬁrst
strategy and to delete the doubles reducing this way the number of states to
explore.
When using TOM, contrary to systems like ELAN or Prolog, the search
space has to be handled explicitly. On one side this leads to more complex
implementations, but on the other side, this gives more ﬂexibility for the
description of search strategies which are thus speciﬁc and optimized. In the
current implementation, we start with a set of states which contains the initial
state. Then, for each state of the set, we compute the set of successors: all the
states that can be reached by applying a single transition step. This process
is repeated until either an attack is found in the set of states or a ﬁx-point is
reached: no more transition can be performed.
Assuming that start is the initial state where all the agents are in SLEEP
state, that set1 and set2 are Java collections and that computeSuccessors
is a function that takes a state as input and computes a set of successors, the
presented strategy can be implemented as follows:
public boolean breadthSearch(State start) {
set1.add(start);
while(!set1.isEmpty()) {
Iterator it = set1.iterator();
while(it.hasNext()) { computeSuccessors(it.next(),set2); }
if(set2.contains(ATTACK)) { return true; }
set1 = set2;
}
return false;
}
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4.4 Comparing the TOM Implementation to Existing Approaches
We compare the TOM speciﬁcation to a similar one deﬁned in the model-
checker Murϕ [11], and to another one described in the rewrite based language
ELAN [3]. We have chosen the latter one essentially for historical reasons and
the former one due to the indirect comparisons it provides. These approaches
are very similar to the TOM one in the way they describe the protocol, making
thus the comparison of the eﬃciency of these implementations quite reliable.
Of course, several other implementations of the protocol are available (e.g.
in Spin or Maude) but a direct comparison have not been realized due to
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the corresponding speciﬁcations.
In ELAN the rules describing the protocol and the strategy guiding these
rules are deﬁned at the same level. We obtain thus a uniform speciﬁcation but,
although the strategy language is fairly powerful and the deﬁnition of a depth-
ﬁrst search method is natural and simple, the description of breadth-ﬁrst
strategies is complex and needs a modiﬁcation of the existing rules. Several
operators like, for example, the ones used for building the list of messages, are
declared as associative-commutative avoiding thus some implicit manipulation
like sorting the messages.
The rules used in the Murϕ implementation are similar to the ones used
in the ELAN and TOM speciﬁcation but the number of interacting agents is
built-in. There are two possible built-in veriﬁcation strategies (depth-ﬁrst and
breadth-ﬁrst) that are speciﬁed at execution time. Several optimizations like,
for example, a reduction by symmetry that allows one to cut (signiﬁcantly)
the search space, are available.
First, we can compare the ease of modeling of these approaches. For
this, we need to use some kind of metric like the one used in [1]. As the
metric reﬂects only part of the story, care must be taken in interpreting the
results. We will compare the number of lines in the diﬀerent parts of the
speciﬁcation. This is not problem free, as the number of lines is inﬂuenced by
layout conventions, and there must be compromise between code size, clarity
of the speciﬁcation and development time.
Lines Total Stripped Data Rules Control
Murϕ 449 323 47 255 Built-in
ELAN 439 250 49 154 35
TOM 563 381 30 258 75
Total measures the lines in the entire speciﬁcation, including comments,
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Number of Network
size
Time (seconds)
send rcv Murϕ ELAN TOM
1 1 1 0.11 0.01 0.08
1 1 2 1.47 0.11 0.34
1 1 3 38.90 1.20 0.66
2 1 1 2.76 0.49 0.51
2 1 2 77.01 - 7.88
2 2 1 69.50 39.04 3.52
3 1 1 13.69 34.90 2.62
3 2 1 703.76 - 69.59
2 2 2 6456.53 - 234.54
Fig. 2. Comparison of the Murϕ, ELAN and TOM implementations.
while Stripped is the size of the speciﬁcation code, without comments. The
other columns compare the size of the declarations for the data structures, of
the model deﬁnition, and of the control procedures.
Note that the main diﬀerence for this metric is the size of the control
procedures. As mentioned before, in Murϕ the exploration strategy is built-in
and the rules are applied repeatedly in a depth-ﬁrst or breadth-ﬁrst manner.
In ELAN user-deﬁned rewriting strategies are used while in TOM the control
is expressed using the native language Java. This leads to a ﬁne grained and
very ﬂexible control in TOM, but the counterpart is the length of the control
procedures.
This ﬁne grained control over the execution of the model leads to an op-
timized execution of the model. Tests are performed on a 1,4 GHz Xeon
workstation with 512MB memory and 256KB cache. For these tests, we con-
sider the ﬁxed version of the protocol, as described in [9]. We explore thus the
entire search space, showing that there are no attacks in the corrected version
of the protocol when variable numbers of agents and messages in the network
are considered.
The results presented in Figure 2 clearly show the interest of the TOM
approach. On small problems, the eﬃciency is comparable to Murϕ and ELAN.
On bigger examples (2 senders, 2 receivers and 1 message in the network for
example), the experimental results show that TOM is 10 to 20 times faster
than ELAN and Murϕ.
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Let us remind that the presented implementation is written in Java, com-
pared to the Murϕ and ELAN versions which are respectively written in C++
and C. Therefore, the gain does not come from low level implementation de-
tails: the performance improvement comes from the way the search space is
explored. In ELAN, due to backtracking, a depth-ﬁrst search strategy is ap-
plied. In Murϕ, we used a breadth-ﬁrst search strategy combined with sym-
metry reduction optimizations similar to our sorting procedures. In TOM,
we used the very simple breadth-ﬁrst search strategy described in Section 4.3
combined with a maximally-shared representation of states (obtained implic-
itly thanks to ApiGen). This allows us to eﬃciently compare and eliminate
redundant states and thus to reduce the search space. Since TOM does
not support associative-commutative matching, two equivalent states could
be represented diﬀerently (the order in which messages and nonces are stored
is important). To improve the sharing of such states, we use sorted lists of
messages and nonces in such a way that we manipulate canonical representa-
tions. Thus, the comparison of two states can be performed in constant time,
by comparing pointers.
The results presented in Table 2 also show that for some parameters (3
senders and 2 receivers for example) the ELAN version cannot verify the
correctness of the protocol within 512MB of memory.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed an approach merging declarative and imperative paradigms
for the veriﬁcation of the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol. The rules
describing the protocol are easily represented by TOM conditional rewrite
rules. The built-in list-matching available in TOM allows us to express and
easily handle the random selection of agents from a set of agents or of a
message from a set of messages.
The rewrite rules of the implementation describe the behavior of the agents
and of the intruder as well as the invariants to be veriﬁed. The number of
senders and receivers as well as the maximum number of messages in the
network is not ﬁxed but can be given at veriﬁcation time.
We obtain this way a concise speciﬁcation which is both ﬂexible and eﬃ-
cient. The performances of our speciﬁcation are better than those obtained
with other tools.
An obvious continuation of this work would be, on the one hand, the
improvement of our implementation methods like, for example, better asso-
ciative or associative-commutative matching algorithms. On the other hand,
more complex protocols should be speciﬁed and veriﬁed with such a hybrid
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approach for modeling strategies. The comparison of our technique in terms
of expressiveness and eﬃciency should be extended to other tools like Spin,
for example.
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